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INTRODUCTION 
   
 
The  accusation  of  activism  has  been  leveled  against  the  judicial 
branch of American government, and specifically against the United States 
Supreme Court, for many years. Many advocates of this criticism seem to 
explicitly or implicitly maintain – finding it repugnant – that the Court has 
followed and expanded upon the famous dictum of Chief Justice Earl Warren 
who  claimed  that  the  8th  Amendment,  because  of  its  imprecise  wording 
designating a non-static scope of validity, ‘must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’1. 
While  this  statement  initially  referred  only  to  the  ‘cruel  and  unusual 
punishment’ phrase, I believe that the majority – if not all – of the critics of 
judicial activism would decisively  assert that this quote rather accurately 
describes the basic trends of the Supreme Court’s activity in many realms of 
Constitutional jurisprudence. Without a shadow of doubt they would all agree 
that the highest judicial tribunal in the land has often usurped the power of 
‘determining  upon  its  own  judgment  whether  particular  legislation  was 
desirable. The Court thus came virtually to exercise the functions of a ‘super-
legislature’  […]  ‘a  third  chamber  in  the  United  States’.  According  to 
supporters  of  this  viewpoint,  the  Court  has  unjustifiably  and 
unconstitutionally appointed itself ‘the Supreme Censor of all legislation’2. It 
should be pointed out that the very term ‘judicial activism’ is equivocal. It 
may signify that judges and Justices go against either the explicit or implicit 
intent of the Founding Fathers or of the Constitution’s Framers; that they 
                                                           
DOI : 10.2478/wrlae-2013-0025 
* PhD; LLM; University of Wroclaw, Department of Political and Legal Doctrines; 
l.machaj@prawo.uni.wroc.pl 
1 Trop v Dulles (1958) 356 US 86, 100-101. 
2 Bernard Schwartz, The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect (Ronald 
Press 1957) 13-14. 14  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1:2 
 
adopt a different construction of certain Constitutional clauses from the one 
originally accepted by people living during the times of the Constitutional 
Convention; that while solving hard cases they refuse to seriously take into 
account the wishes and demands of the majority of citizens; that they violate 
the rights of democratically-elected legislatures; that they base their decisions 
or  verdicts  upon  evolving,  enigmatic  and  unclear  standards  or  tests  (for 
instance, ‘strict scrutiny’, ‘Lemon test’ or ‘O’Brien standard’) which simply 
cannot be found in the plain text of the Constitution; that, making use of the 
fact that they wield truly extraordinary discretionary power, they attempt to 
translate their political preferences, animosities and idiosyncrasies into law; 
that they do not leave the settlement of political issues and disputes to political 
institutions.  No  matter  which  of  the  above-mentioned  definitions  is 
promulgated by a particular advocate of judicial restraint, they all seem to 
lead to a similar, inescapable conclusion: the U.S. Supreme Court (and all the 
other courts which follow its lead) is basically an undemocratic institution 
which subverts the will of the people, blithely tramples over people’s right of 
self-rule, upsets the separation of powers as envisioned by Montesquieu3 and 
infringes upon the sacred principles of the American system of government.     
  This interpretative paradigm of the Suprem e Court’s role is loudly 
proclaimed  by  a  great  deal  of  the  representatives  of  the  political  Right 
(particularly by those of  the conservative persuasion). Robert Bork is  of 
course its most recognized and vocal protagonist4 but by no means is he the 
only one. Let us take Lino A. Graglia’s article as an instructive example of 
anti-activist  fervor.  He  passionately  argues  that  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court 
perverts the function of law in a democratic society which is ‘to express, 
cultivate, and enforce the values of the society as understood by the majority 
of its people’. According to Graglia, Justices consistently aim to overthrow 
and undermine these traditional values, depriving the American citizens of 
their most essential and cherished right of self-government. The Supreme 
Court  has  transformed  the  American  political  model  into  a  tiny  judicial 
oligarchy. Justices have arbitrarily appointed themselves ‘the final lawmakers 
on any public policy issue that they choose to remove from the ordinary 
political process’. He goes as far as comparing the Supreme Court to the 
Grand Council of Ayatollahs in the Iranian political system. Graglia claims 
that  Justices,  being  members  of  a  ‘cultural  elite’,  have  appropriated  – 
obviously in an unconstitutional manner – the role of ‘the system’s highest 
authority’.  All  of  the  above-mentioned  factors  inevitably  lead  to  ‘the 
extraordinary  result  in  a  supposedly  democratic  society’:  law  becomes 
dependent on ‘the values and preferences of a powerful nine-person elite’, 
members of which do not hesitate to advance, per fas et nefas, their personal 
preferences by enacting them into law. While the Constitution precludes very 
few possible policy choices, the Justices impose far too many limitations, 
allegedly  inferred  from  the  Constitution,  on  the  majority’s  will.  Graglia 
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concludes  emphatically  by  saying  that  the  American  system  is  currently 
nothing  more  than  ‘a  tyranny  of  minority’5.  Similar  voices  can  –  albeit 
admittedly  more  sporadically  –  be  heard  on  the  other  end  of  political 
spectrum. Jamin B. Raskin’s book provides us with an illustrative example6. 
The author strongly maintains that ‘progressives have almost always had 
more cause than conservatives to assail the activism of the Supreme Court, 
which  has  been  a  force  of  ferocious  political  reaction  for  most  of  its 
existence’. The era of the Rehnquist Court was particularly troublesome to 
Raskin since during that time the unifying philosophy of the majority was not 
‘federalism, judicial restraint, strict textualism, or original intent but hostility 
to  popular  democracy’.  Throughout  its  institutional  history  the  Supreme 
Court often invalidated laws which did not violate explicit Constitutional 
provisions, overextending its authority beyond proper limits. It has been – as 
Raskin puts it – ‘a historic disappointment’ and sometimes even ‘a nightmare’ 
as  far  as  neutrality,  objectivity  and  ‘refraining  from  aggressive  judicial 
activism based on the political preferences of the justices’ are concerned; its 
strictly politically motivated decisions have struck down a lot of progressive 
legislation. Justices have very regularly ‘failed to defer to the decisions of 
elected  branches,  repeatedly  betrayed  a  doctrine  of  strict  textualism  or 
Framers’ "original intent", have not even pretended to defer to case precedent, 
refused  to  conform  to  jurisdictional  limitations  on  the  Court’s  power, 
spontaneously  invented  new  constitutional  rights  and  theories,  imposed 
continuing affirmative obligations on the other branches [of government], and 
used  judicial  power  to  accomplish  partisan  objectives.  Each  of  these 
deployments of judicial activism collides with  the right of the people to 
practice democratic self-government’. Raskin goes even further by arguing 
that the Court has subverted ‘political principles and rights for which the 
people have been fighting during the past two centuries of civilizing struggle’. 
While Graglia and Raskin may – and certainly do – disagree on specifics, the 
general tenor of their conclusions seems remarkably – taking into account 
their fundamental political differences – similar, if in fact not identical.  
 
 
I.   
 
It is my contention that the perception of the Supreme Court as an 
undemocratic body is generally mistaken. The critics of judicial activism 
make several incorrect assumptions and disregard important political and 
legal factors. First, they misunderstand the very nature and basic principles of 
a constitutional democracy. Second, they tend to ignore the role played by 
constitutions in general and the American Constitution in particular in social 
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reality, effectively forgetting the reasons for the latter’s hallowed place in the 
United States national psyche. Third, they ignore the presence of political 
factors (and even partisan calculations) in the process of appointments to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Fourth, they misconceive the realities of the process of 
legal reasoning and of Constitutional interpretation. Fifth, they underestimate 
or even fail to recognize the influence of public opinion on the basic trends 
of judicial decision-making. In my opinion the debate on the questions of 
judicial  activism,  judicial  restraint,  and  democratic  legitimacy  of 
constitutional courts is  usually pointless and leads  us  astray. The proper 
subject of inquiry into judicial decisions should be whether they are correct 
(obviously from a legal, not political or ideological, point of view), and not 
whether they conform to some imprecise notions of allegedly democratic 
judicial restraint7. Let me be clear that I am not trying to prove too much. 
Certain decisions of the Supreme Court can more or less accurately be 
described as ‘activist’, but only if and only because they are legally wrong 
(e.g.  they  are  examples  of  patently  clear  lawmaking,  they  misinterpret 
Constitutional clauses or they ignore earlier precedents without expressly 
overruling them). In other words, a decision is not wrong because it is an 
example of activism, but rather it may be an example of activism because it 
is wrong8. To reverse this order is to put  the cart before the horse and to 
concentrate on bogeymen (like ‘undemocratic Court’, ‘tyranny of judges’, 
‘judicial  oligarchy’,  ‘pernicious  activism’,  etc.)  which  may  be  an 
advantageous endeavor for politicians but not for legal scholars. In any case 
let us carefully consider the five arguments given above one by one. 
   
  A. 
The first point is so glaringly obvious it feels almost embarrassing to 
be forced to make it. The detractors of the Supreme Court tend to perceive a 
situation in which Justices, during the process of constitutional adjudication, 
decide  to  invalidate  certain  legislation  which  enjoys  overwhelming  and 
widespread popular support, as somewhat problematic. It simply is not, from 
both  a  theoretical  and  practical  standpoint.  First  and  foremost,  critics  of 
activism  seem  to  conveniently  forget  that  the  Constitution  also  is  an 
emanation  of  the  people’s  will.  Provided  the  document  is  interpreted 
correctly, it is quite absurd to maintain that any decision the U.S. Supreme 
Court may have reached thwarts some fundamental democratic principles. 
Even if we have nearly unanimous popular support for certain measure, and 
only  five  Justices  out  of  the  whole  society  consider  it  constitutionally 
inadmissible  and  act  accordingly,  their  actions  should  not  be  seen  as 
undemocratic  (assuming,  again,  that  their  interpretation  is  correct).  The 
purported existence of a national consensus on any issue of public interest 
should  be  treated  as  absolutely  irrelevant  to  judicial  deliberations.  Any 
majority (and particularly a transient one) may – and often does – desire 
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unconstitutional solutions, and it is a constitutional tribunal’s legal obligation 
to prevent it from reaching its goal. That is the whole point of having any sort 
of  judicial  review.  Putting  it  a  bit  differently,  countering  majoritarian 
impulses in the name of a constitution is not per se an undemocratic activity; 
while the right of constitutional courts to have ‘a last word’9 in matters of 
constitutional adjudication can be – and sometimes is – abused, we ought to 
remember that abusus non tollit usum; ‘counter-majoritarian’ difficulty”10, 
though undoubtedly real, is not a ‘counter-democratic difficulty’. That is why, 
for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court was absolutely right when it summarily 
refused to reconsider its earlier decision which protected expressive rights of 
flag desecrators only because a significant majority of Americans found flag 
profanation  reprehensible  and  wanted  it  criminalized  (which  is  what  the 
government would have the Court do)11. Notwithstanding the merits of the 
original decision12 (and there is, in my assessment, plenty to argue about), the 
Court properly recognized public sentiment as an immaterial factor. Jeremy 
A. Waldron may be substantially correct in saying that ‘in order to provide a 
democratic justification for the judges’ prevailing’ over the voting powers of 
the  people’s  representatives,  ‘one  has  to  show  not  only  that  they  have 
democratic credentials but that they have a better democratic claim than that 
asserted in the legislative action in question’13 (though weaker democratic-
ness should not be automatically equated with  undemocratic-ness; it is a 
continuum,  not  a  dichotomy).  Nevertheless,  can  we  imagine  a  stronger 
democratic  legitimacy  than  the  one  inferred  more  or  less  directly  from 
constitutions themselves and applied in order to prevent transient majorities 
from violating (arguendo) the highest law of the land? 
Furthermore,  the  opponents  of  activism  often  seem  to  display  a 
tendency  to  identify  democracy  primarily  with  a  procedural  system  of 
majority rule. This is a typical pars pro toto mistake which causes them to 
misconceive the very nature of American political model. To some degree it 
is generally reasonable to maintain that vigorous judicial review ‘stands in 
contradistinction to majoritarian democracy […] If nine unelected justices 
[…]  can overturn the product of the majoritarian branches of government, 
then they defeat or curb the democratic will. A majoritarian democracy cannot 
tolerate unelected and unaccountable officials making major changes in the 
law, and sometimes overturning the law and replacing it with what they think 
the law should be. This usurps the purpose of the majoritarian branches of 
government  and  leads  to  judicial  tyranny’14.  However,  to  conclude  that 
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straightforward and mostly exception-free rule of the majority lies at the core 
of democracy is to go wide of the mark. The political system of the United 
States (as well as almost all contemporary Western models of government) 
can be more accurately described as a constitutional democracy where the 
Constitution has been explicitly introduced – at least partly – in order to 
provide barriers against the unfettered pretensions and wishes of popular or 
legislative majorities. Being anti-majoritarian is not the same thing as being 
anti-democratic. The existence of a constitutional  judge should rather be 
treated  as  an  indispensable  corollary,  a  constitutive  criterion,  of  a  true 
constitutional democracy which is not ‘the power of the majority because 
there can exist an absolutism of “the several”, or a legislative absolutism 
similar to the absolutism […] “of one alone” or a royal absolutism’15.    
Let me conclude on a slightly personal note by saying that it is quite 
disconcerting and baffling to a European ear to hear staunch conservatives (I 
certainly understand progressives like Raskin) denouncing judicial elitism 
and passionately extolling the virtues of unchecked majoritarian rule. While 
American  and  European  historical  experiences  are  obviously  divergent, 
nobody ought to forget that tyranny of the majority is not just an abstract 
theoretical  concept  envisaged  by  social  thinkers  from  Aristotle  to  de 
Tocqueville but a really serious danger against which we would do well to – 
borrowing the famous phrase of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes – remain 
eternally  vigilant.  While  majorities  are  prone  to  committing  the  most 
atrocious mistakes, constitutional democracies’ record in that regard – albeit 
by no means a perfect one – makes for far more pleasant reading. Finally, if 
a majority disapproves of judicial interpretations of the Constitution, it can 
always resort to amending the document. If it is true that the Supreme Court 
constantly  blocks  the  popular  will,  the  successful  introduction  of  certain 
amendments aimed at ensuring that the majority’s wishes are fulfilled should 
not  be  too  difficult  from  a  purely  political  perspective.  Even  the  most 
‘activist’ judiciary could not stop that.   
   
B.  
What is the purpose of having constitutions? It seems reasonable to 
assume that such documents are ‘the foundation of all other legislation’16 and 
– by extension – of a given sociopolitical system. Therefore, constitutions 
ought to (and usually do) state the most basic principles operating in a given 
society, determine the relations between different branches of government, 
enumerate  the  functions  or  tasks  of  political  institutions  and  define  the 
fundamental  rights,  freedoms,  and  duties  of  citizens.  In  other  words, 
constitutions provide a general outline of political and legal systems. While it 
is certainly correct to say that the main body of the U.S. Constitution focuses 
primarily on structural issues, contains ‘precious few direct references to the 
protection of  individual rights’ and  is  first  and foremost  ‘devoted to  the 
implementation  of  an  intricate  and  innovative  political  theory  –  a 
constitutionally limited, federally structured, representative democracy’, it 
nevertheless  cannot  be  denied that the  ‘political  structure adopted in  the 
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Constitution was designed simultaneously to preserve individual liberty and 
to avoid tyranny […] political structure and constitutional rights (should be) 
viewed as necessary but insufficient parts of a symbiotic, organic whole17 (an 
observation which gained even more potency when the Bill of Rights came 
into effect). Obviously constitutions usually leave legislative bodies a lot of 
room to maneuver in order to enable them to act in accordance with  the 
current majority’s preferences. Because of these conflicting factors, there 
exists  an  observable  tension  between  the  foundational  role  played  by 
constitutions and the need for giving a certain leeway to legislatures; usually 
some delicate balance has  to  be struck.  However, proponents  of judicial 
restraint insist on shifting this balance firmly in one direction, which would 
have  the  unfortunate  and  maybe  unforeseen  consequence  of  rendering 
constitutions largely toothless and meaningless. Such a development would 
be particularly troublesome particularly in the American context. If we accept 
the  position  that  the  United  States  Constitution  precludes  –  to  borrow 
Graglia’s words – very few public policy choices, we necessarily make the 
document essentially irrelevant with respect to the major controversies of our 
time. Let us take the Free Speech Clause as an illustrative example. The 
provision can either be interpreted narrowly as, for instance, a rule prohibiting 
only  prior  restraint18  or protecting only  expressly  political speech 19,  or 
expansively as a means of   guaranteeing everyone a general freedom of 
expression (as the Supreme Court has done for many decades). Let us assume 
that both interpretations are substantially correct,20 i.e. that they both can be 
justified in light of some comprehensive theory of judicial reasoning. Which 
construction should be adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court? Opponents of 
activism would of course unanimously prefer the former one.  It obviously 
follows  that  –  from  this  perspective  –  such  issues  as,  for  example, 
governmental  control  over  hate  speech,  entertainment,  symbolic  speech. 
music etc. are not – as a general rule – covered (or at least protected) by the 
First Amendment. To put it in different terms, the Constitution is supposedly 
silent on the subject of potential criminalization of non-verbal expression of 
ideas, of publishing immoral literary works, of showing stupefying motion 
pictures or of playing tasteless music. While it may be a sound and coherent 
intellectual proposition,  does  it really  adequately  reflect  the place  of the 
Constitution  in  American  society?  I  believe  that  to  take  this  view  is  to 
completely ignore the foundational function of constitutions. Moreover – 
which is crucial as far as democracy is concerned – such a paradigm does not 
appear to correspond with the wishes of the United States’ citizens. American 
reverence for Constitution – not only as a legal monument but as a living thing 
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–  is  a  rare,  if  not  unique,  phenomenon  in  comparison  to  other  Western 
democracies. Would that fierce pride in this part of their national heritage 
survive if the Constitution became irrelevant and indifferent to controversial 
legislative  efforts  undertaken  by  a  transient  majority?  If  we  turn  the 
Constitution into little more than a government manual, I very much doubt it.  
   
C.  
To maintain that the Supreme Court is an undemocratic institution is 
to ignore both the theory and practice of Justices’ selection. In its general 
form, the appointment process does not violate any democratic principle. It is 
worth pointing out that the Supreme Court is not a self-perpetuating entity 
which  utilizes  a  method  of  co-optation;  when  a  vacancy  comes  up,  the 
remaining Justices play no official institutional role in filling the post. The 
Justices are also not elected by an undemocratic body, and obviously a place 
on the bench is not inherited. Those are classic undemocratic methods of 
selection.  It  cannot  be  overemphasized  that  a  Justice’s  nomination  and 
subsequent appointment comes as a direct consequence of actions undertaken 
by  democratically  elected  representatives  of  the  people.  For  sure,  the 
democratic legitimacy of a Justice may not be as clear-cut and direct as it is 
in the case of Presidents and Senators; for sure, the fact that it is a lifetime 
appointment reduces the importance of democratic factors; for sure, the fact 
that  a  Justice  –  barring  impeachment  –  cannot  be  removed  from  office 
diminishes  his  or  her  responsibility  before  the  people.  These  all  seem, 
however, to be merely quantitative rather than qualitative differences. To 
refuse  to  recognize  the  democratic  origins  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  to 
subscribe  to  some  radical  version  of  democracy  not  taken  out  of  ‘The 
Federalist  Papers’  but  rather  directly  from  the  writings  of  Jean  Jacques 
Rousseau. Anyhow, nobody can seriously state that, say, the Secretary of 
State or Chairman of the Federal Reserve are chosen undemocratically even 
though they are not elected by popular vote. What is even more crucial to 
remember,  political  factors  and  calculations  currently  occupy  a  very 
prominent place during the process of a Justice’s appointment. To put an 
ironic twist on the matter, it was Bork’s failed nomination to the Supreme 
Court which for the first time put such issues front and center. As Norman 
Vieira and Leonard Gross point out, ‘the Bork proceedings clearly established 
a firm precedent for ideological inquiries and for the rejection of judicial 
nominees, at least in some instances, on purely ideological grounds […] there 
was scant precedent before the Bork hearings for rejecting Supreme Court 
nominees  because  of  their  judicial  philosophy’21.  So  now,  judicial 
philosophies, judicial decisions touching upon ideological issues, judicial 
political convictions and affiliations are all the subject of debates during the 
appointment process. In other words, the success or failure of a Justice’s 
nomination  is  to  a  large  degree  dependent  upon  his  political  stance; 
democratically-elected Presidents and Senators enter these factors into the 
equation. We may either deplore or praise this development, but it is an 
objective reality. It seems even more significant that every citizen making an 
electoral decision can make reasonable assumptions concerning the kind of 
Justice their representative will support or oppose. You will get one type of 
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Justice if the decision is made by hard-core Republicans; you will get a totally 
different one if the choice rests in the hands of moderate Democrats. It is even 
often quite possible to identify a prospective Justice’s position on specific 
issues like abortion, gun-owners rights, same-sex marriage etc. Therefore 
citizens are able to (and do) influence – consciously or unconsciously – the 
direction  of  constitutional  jurisprudence.  The  fact  that  their  political 
calculations may be mistaken and that sometimes unsatisfactory – from a 
certain voter’s point of view – deals or compromises concerning judicial 
appointments get made does not render the Supreme Court an undemocratic 
institution.  After  all,  are  not  the  electorate’s  mistakes  and  political 
compromises simply an inevitable component or even the bread-and-butter of 
a democratic political system?   
 
D.  
Up to now I have attempted to demonstrate that the mechanism of 
judicial review (aggressive, if need be) and the existence of a Supreme Court 
unhesitant to defy the majority’s wishes do not in themselves violate the basic 
principles of constitutional – if not majoritarian – democracy. The advocate 
of judicial restraint may nevertheless reply that the real problem with the 
Supreme Court’s activism and its lack of democratic legitimacy lies in a 
method of judicial reasoning which has been often – and especially for the 
last fifty years – employed by clear majority of Justices. The argument would 
be that while the Court may not be per se an undemocratic institution, its 
modus operandi still infringes upon the people’s rights. The main case in 
point would be Justices’ willingness to authoritatively disqualify laws which 
cannot be described as evidently unconstitutional. The opponent of activism 
may claim that the Supreme Court by its expansive construction of many 
Constitutional clauses often crosses the threshold between law interpretation 
and lawmaking. I believe that in most situations such allegations are a direct 
result  of  misunderstanding  the  nature  of  judges’  –  and  particularly 
constitutional judges’ – activity. The old pragmatist dichotomy between ‘law 
in books’ and ‘law in action’ proves useful in explaining that statement. At 
the beginning every legal rule is nothing more than a text which – in order to 
become  a  part  of  sociopolitical  reality  –  needs  to  be  subjected  to 
interpretation.  Putting  it  in  slightly  different  terms,  the  very  process  of 
understanding  even  the  simplest  legal  rule  includes  a  component  of 
interpretation. While we may accept the old clara non sunt interpretanda 
maxim as correct, in the realm of law nothing – or at least hardly anything – 
is so clear as not to require interpretation. Therefore, by necessity, law is 
always what judges (and other governmental bodies) say it is. Contrary to 
Montesquieu’s position, judges are not merely passive beings; by definition 
they play a very active role in the lawmaking process. This observation is 
valid in all circumstances. Once again, this fact may be deplored or extolled, 
but it is a fact. It is especially important to note that – from a formal standpoint 
– judges do not have to remain within the parameters set by the legislator’s 
interpretation. Just like a reader of Shakespeare may find in the bard’s dramas 
a meaning unintended by their author, a judge may often discover in a legal 22  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1:2 
 
text previously hidden senses which were unforeseen by a lawmaker. Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes – though hardly an objective voice – sums it up 
correctly: ‘When we are dealing with words that also are a constitutive act, 
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have 
called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen 
completely  by  the  most  gifted  of  its  begetters’22.  While  this  interpretive 
liberty is by no means absolute, a judge is usually left with a lot of breathing 
space. A constitutional judge’s duty is to select the rules of interpretation that 
he or she will apply in the course of his or her decision-making. In the context 
of American jurisprudence, as I have already intimated, this choice is always 
an arbitrary and activist – though of course not unrestricted – one. As Richard 
A.  Posner  sagaciously  remarks,  ‘you  can  adopt  an  interpretive  rule  that 
constitutional rights cannot be created by implication but must be stated 
expressly in the Constitution […] But the choice of that interpretive rule is 
not  something  that  can  be  derived  by  reasoning  from  agreed-upon 
premises’23. Therefore there is nothing inherently more ‘activist’ in selecting 
one set of interpretive rules over another, as Frederick Schauer’s analogy 
plainly  –  though  maybe  unintentionally  –  demonstrates.  In  his  opinion, 
constitutional language is like ‘a black canvas’. ‘We know when we have 
gone off the edge of the canvass even though the canvas itself gives us no 
guidance as to what to put on it’24. If Justices stray beyond this canvas, we 
may with justification call their decision an ‘activist’ one. However, as long 
as  Justices  remain  within  the  frame  of  the  canvas,  they  discharge  their 
Constitutional duties properly.  
A critic of the Supreme Court may still insist that, by refusing to apply 
a  particular  set  of  interpretive  rules  (based  on  e.g.  originalism  or  strict 
textualism),  Justices  behave  in  an  activist  and  therefore  undemocratic 
manner. Such an allegation misses the point and forces us to focus on a factor 
which is a side-issue at best, and a completely irrelevant distraction at worst. 
The proper inquiry should concentrate on two other fundamental things. The 
first  basic  question  is  whether  the  constitutional  canvas  is  covered  by  a 
masterpiece or kitsch. The best results may be sometimes achieved by strictly 
sticking to the Framers’ instructions on what and how to paint; sometimes by 
applying  a  contemporary  understanding  of  particular  clauses  in  the 
Constitution; sometimes by complying with the majority’s wishes; sometimes 
by going right against the grain of current public opinion; sometimes by 
adhering to principles of strict textualism; sometimes by employing more 
dynamic methods of legal reasoning. In this respect, the end is far more 
important than the means of attaining it. The second issue which should be 
emphasized while evaluating the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is whether a 
picture gradually emerging on a certain canvas remains an internally coherent 
one. Once the Supreme Court agrees to apply particular interpretive rules to 
a particular Constitutional clause, it has to apply them consistently in every 
relevant case. Changing the interpretive rules depending on the essentially 
immaterial vagaries of a given case is incorrect (and can be described as 
‘activist’). Let us once again use the example of the allegedly undemocratic 
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flag desecration decisions. Once the Supreme Court accepted the position that 
the First Amendment protects at least some methods of non-verbal expression 
of ideas, it cannot blatantly ignore the fact that the definition of symbolic 
speech (there has to be an intent to convey a particularized message which in 
great likelihood will be understood by viewers25) encompasses expressive 
flag burning. This would be precisely the worst kind of activism. Therefore 
the fact that the flag-burning decisions were opposed by a significant majority 
of  the  American  public  has  nothing  to  do  with  their  democratic  or 
undemocratic character.  
 
E. 
I admit that the fifth point is the most controversial one. I do not 
believe that the courts are as insular as opponents of activism portray them to 
be. To a large degree, judicial institutions – including the U.S. Supreme Court 
–  are not  immune to  outside pressures  and  take into account  sentiments 
exhibited by ordinary citizens. For sure, I do not intend to say that there are 
no tensions between judges and public opinion. We can observe evidence of 
such tensions almost every day. However, these conflicts often seem to be 
blown totally out of proportion by both media and politicians who naturally 
prefer to focus their attention on things that do not work or are headed in the 
wrong direction. Because of that, we are often inclined to neglect the fact that 
the courts and public opinion very often – from a long-term perspective – 
remain in at least basic agreement. In other words, sooner or later the spirit of 
the times can usually find its way into many judicial decisions and opinions. 
Some specific examples will serve to illuminate my point. Forgetting about 
the merits of the legal reasoning applied in the following cases, let us start by 
contrasting a general sentiment expressed in the notorious Lochner decision 
(1905)26 with ideological undertones clearly present in two later decisions, 
i.e. Nebbia  v New York27  and  Wickard  v Filburn28. The former  – which 
invalidated  state  regulation  establishing  a  maximum  number  of  working 
hours for employees working in bakeries and confectionaries – reads like an 
excerpt from a libertarian manifesto. Justice Peckham’s opinion denounces – 
in no uncertain terms – governmental paternalism, sets rigid limits on a state’s 
police power, praises individual freedom and liberty of contract and criticizes 
unsubstantiated governmental claims to interfere with citizens’ private lives. 
From a sociopolitical perspective, the Lochner decision is emblematic of the 
period of untamed capitalism, laissez-faire, individualism, self-sufficiency 
etc. It perfectly mirrors these commonly recognized values. Only twenty nine 
years later - in the Nebbia decision – the Supreme Court rules that it is within 
the constitutional power of a state to regulate prices of milk. Justice Roberts’ 
opinion  emphasizes  that  ‘neither  property  rights  nor  contract  rights  are 
absolute;  for  government  cannot  exist  if  the  citizen  may  at  will  use  his 
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property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract 
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the 
public to regulate it in the common interest’. Barely eight years later – in the 
Wickard decision – the Court goes even further and declares that the federal 
government is constitutionally allowed to set compulsory national marketing 
quotas with respect to agricultural products. It is rather obvious that these 
decisions are based on principles diametrically opposed to those adopted in 
the Lochner ruling. Nevertheless, they also reflect the spirit of times when the 
experience of the Great Depression and New Deal stimulated skepticism 
towards  unrestrained  capitalism  and  made  people  far  more  receptive  to 
interventionist concepts. An analogous diagnosis can be made as far as the 
First Amendment jurisprudence is concerned. For comparative purposes, we 
can use on one hand the Chaplinsky29 and Beauharnais30 decisions, in which 
free speech claims were summarily and quite imperiously dismissed and 
punishment  for  relatively  innocuous  –  at  least  by  today’s  standards  – 
expression upheld, and on the other the Cohen decision in which the Supreme 
Court, following a careful and detailed examination of the question, declared 
that a citizen has a right to enter a courtroom wearing a t-shirt emblazoned 
with profanities31. These decisions also appear to be a  reflection of social 
circumstances and changing public attitudes. While it is almost impossible to 
imagine that during the 1940s a majority of Justices  would extend  First 
Amendment protection to the pronouncement ‘Fuck the draft’, it is equally 
unthinkable  that  during  the  1970s  the  Supreme  Court  would  find  no 
Constitutional  problem  with  criminally  punishing  someone  for  uttering 
phrases  like  ‘damned  Fascist’  or  for  complaining  about  the  number  of 
‘Negroes’ in certain neighborhoods. Such decisions are more understandable 
if we place them within the existing social context. To sum up, significant 
doctrinal  shifts  in  the  general  tendencies  of  the  Supreme  Court’s 
jurisprudence can often be explained by looking at the broader social situation 
in which they occurred; Justices are by no means absolutely impervious to 
democratic public opinion. This regularity has been consistently present in 
the Supreme Court’s history, transcending political and ideological factors. 
For  example,  with  respect  to  judicial  review  of  economic  legislation  a 
libertarian interpretive paradigm has been supplanted by an interventionist 
one, whereas in the free speech jurisprudence conservative positions have 
largely been replaced by libertarian ones. Let me stress once again that I am 
not attempting to overreach and to prove too much. In many specific cases 
the disagreement between the Supreme Court and citizenry is undoubtedly 
real and ferocious. Additionally, it should also be admitted that sometimes 
Justices  prefer to  lead or precede public opinion instead of following it. 
However – looking at the issue from a long-term perspective – I am inclined 
to perceive such occurrences more as exceptions than as a rule. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Let me conclude on a personal note. Though fascinated by the United 
States Supreme Court as an institution, by no means can I be described as a 
blind  fan  of  its  rulings.  The  Court  is  obviously  not  an  infallible  entity. 
Sometimes  its  mistakes  are  of  truly  gigantic  proportions,  leaving  later 
commentators scratching their heads in wonder while trying to comprehend 
how certain lapses were even possible. Nevertheless, the Court’s errors, its 
misreading of the Constitution – i.e. of the will of the American people – its 
misinterpretation of law etc. do not render it an undemocratic institution; once 
again, abusus non tollit usum. Incorrect decisions of the Court ought to be 
seen as a consequence of a specific failure in legal reasoning, and not as a 
result of the evil and undemocratic machinations of some elitist clique intent 
on subverting, undermining and destroying the most fundamental principles 
of American democracy.                                                                                          